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Worlds of Political Economy: 
Knowledge, Practices and 
Contestation 
Frank Trentmann and Martin Daunton 
Political economy has been a central component in the making of 
modern societies since the commercial and industrial revolutions of the 
eighteenth century. It provided a dominant knowledge regime for under- 
standing and managing economic relations, and for informing a system 
of practices and policies moulding cultural life and political power in 
state and civil society. Walter Bagehot, writing in 1876, 100 years after 
the publication of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, had little doubt 
about the 'wonderful effect' of 'political economy'. As he put it, with the 
emphasis appropriate to the editor of The Economist, 'The life of almost 
every one in England - perhaps of every one - is different and better in 
consequence of it. The whole commercial policy of the country is not 
so much founded on it as instinct with it . . . . No other form of political 
philosophy has ever had one-thousandth part of the influence on us; its 
teachings have settled down into the common sense of the nation, and 
have become irre~ersible.'~ Bagehot was giving a patriotic rendering of 
a distinctly British embrace of what is often called 'classical' political 
economy: '[ildeas which are paradoxes everywhere else in the world are 
accepted axioms here1. Yet, under different names and with different 
intellectual, social, and political overtones, versions of political econ- 
omy everywhere shaped modern knowledge, practices, and power rela- 
tions, from econornie sociale to historical Staatswissenschaft and Marxism, 
from imperial ecology to transnational savings movements, from civil 
society to international organizations, and from evangelical religion to 
popular (and often radical) political economy. 
This volume is an effort at retrieval, an attempt to explore these broad 
and diverse worlds of political economy that have largely been expunged 
from economics textbooks and from the histories of economic ideas. 
The standard account proposes a fall of political economy and rise of a 
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more abstract and individualistic approach to economic analysis from 
the close of the nineteenth century, with renewed calls for a revival of 
political economy since the 1960s. These have produced Marxist, radical 
and institutionalist critiques of liberal economics, which had become 
the dominant mode of discourse and applied practice in the course of 
the twentieth century. Political economy - in these new heterodox 
schools - focuses on the political and institutional settings of economic 
life, and sought to reassert the role of political power and interests vis- 
a-vis liberal representations of economic individualism. This volume is 
an intervention in this debate. It supports the political repositioning 
of economic subjects but also moves beyond the radical and institu- 
tionalist approaches. Instead of viewing the relationship between eco- 
no~nics and political economy as one of the rise and fall between two 
rival and mutually exclusive systems of knowledge, as in the standard 
account, the volume here reclaims their historical interdependence. 
Rather than presenting a view of the advancing differentiation of eco- 
nomic life from other parts of modern society, culture, and politics, the 
new political economy advocated here explores the large and often neg- 
lected universe of economic knowledge and practices, and the way the 
two have shaped each other. 
Wor-Iris of Politictzl Ecoizolrly makes three related contributions to a new 
study of political economy. First, it argues that knowledge or ideas can- 
not be treated on their own, as in established Dogvrlengeschichte or a high 
intellectual history of economic thoughtI2 but must be reconnected to 
fields of practice. Here we can learn from the debate about text and con- 
text in the literature on political t h ~ u g h t . ~  Economics formed only a 
small part of the richer world of economic knowledge; indeed, until the 
second half of the twentieth century, economists themselves were 
deeply embedded in moral and popular practices and milieus, ranging 
fro111 fiction and advice books to evangelical religion and popular sci- 
e n ~ e . ~  Yet these worlds have all too often been either flattened by grand 
narratives of theoretical revolutions in economics with their focus on 
analytical watersheds, such as the marginalist revolution of the 1880s, 
Keynesianism in the 1930s, or lost altogether in a triumphalist neo- 
Liberalism of the 1970s/80s, where the increasingly hegemonic analytical 
appeal of rational choice models silenced the rich cultural, social and 
ethical dimensions of political economy in the past. 
Second, this volume's attention to the practical and contested work- 
ings of economic knowledge draws attention to the changing appeal, 
location and use of political economy in civil society as well as the state. 
Develop~uent studies and Marxism, and the renewed interest in the 
state in historical sociology in the 1970s and 1980s revived the use of 
the term 'political economy' in a new sense, a claim to reassert politics, 
power and interests in response to the dominance of the rational, 
utility-maximizing economic man of liberal economics. Yet in this work, 
the focus - some would say fixation - lay firmly on state institutions and 
public policy making, resulting in a vast literature with titles such as The 
Political Economy ofForeign Investment in Mexico, The Political Economy of 
Land Reforms, The Political Economy of Coal, or more corporatist inquiries 
into interest groups' capturing of the power of the state.5 At their best, 
these studies revealed the uses and generation of economic knowledge 
by states in domestic and international relations, highlighting, for 
example, the different propensity of different state institutions to 
employ and maintain economic ideas and expertise, and the diverse and 
different degrees of entrance for new theories like Keynesianism into the 
corridors of state power in the mid-twentieth ~ e n t u r y . ~  
Nevertheless, Bagehot recognized in his observation that political 
economy was more than just economic theory and more than just eco- 
nomic policy affecting relations between state and market. It was about 
ideas and practices shaping collective identity and power relations, in 
his words 'the common sense of the nation', or what would now be 
called culture and national identity. Indeed, for much of the nineteenth 
and even twentieth century, as the chapters in this volume will show, 
political economy was a central field of cultural as well as economic 
knowledge. Some of that authority derived from its relation to the state - 
after all, Smith defined political economy as a 'branch of the science of 
a statesman or legi~lator'.~ Commerce, taxation and development were 
crucial here, subjects that were, of course, understood and acted upon 
in different ways depending on different types of state formation. Yet to 
pursue this question simply by turning to the state for answers is to 
ignore more interesting historical questions. For political economy was 
more than statecraft, and before the onset of academic professionalization 
and institutional power in the early and mid-twentieth century, its 
authenticity and legitimacy were derived from multiple, competing 
sources and used different genres of communication. Attempts to under- 
stand and regulate market failure in mid-Victorian Britain, for example, 
were partly energized by a culture of associational life, as Alborn's 
discussion of company law  highlight^.^ Its authority was ultimately 
cultural: economic knowledge and its popularization had a base and 
resonance outside the state in civil society, with its network of associa- 
tions, popular forms of communication and education, and an infinite 
number of schemes of social and self-improvement. 
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Even at a high, more exclusive level - we can think here of the 
I'olitical Economy Club or the British Economic Association (founded in 
1890) - most bodies were dominated by professional, commercial and 
political experts (lawyers, bankers, statesmen and journalists), rather 
than by those intellectuals whose main identity and expertise was that 
of economic  theorist^.^ At a more general level, it is also necessary to 
consider the vast popular turn to political economy amongst social 
reformers, population writers and public health officials, popular Free 
Traders, or the co-operative movement in and beyond Europe. Much 
focus has been on the initial rise of this wave of popular knowledge in 
the early and mid-nineteenth century, but, arguably, it crested in the 
early twentieth century, pushed by the expansion of mass politics and 
education. Thus, for example, the Anti-Corn Law League in Britain in 
the early 1840s organized 800 public lectures and distributed 9 million 
items of publications a year.1° By 1910, by contrast, one Free Trade 
campaigning body alone held over 5000 meetings, from small towns to 
sea-side resorts, in which the superior principles of Free Trade were pop- 
ularly and entertainingly disseminated, while protectionist opponents 
mobilized the new media of film, records and speaking postcards.ll 
I'olitical economy was public engagement and entertainment. And it 
was a popular course in working-class education and self-improvement; 
52 per cent of Workers' Educational Association classes studied eco- 
nomics and economic history in 1913, a proportion that remained 32 
per cent a decade later.12 Nor was the popular communication of eco- 
nomic knowledge a peculiarly British phenomenon, whatever its dis- 
tinctly liberal patriotic flavour. Trade and fiscal policy in other European 
countries were also prisms through which national power and social 
improvement were evaluated. As Todd shows in his discussion of French 
commercial debates after the Napoleonic period, it is misleading to proj- 
ect back in time a purer economistic duality between liberal Free Trade 
and conservative protectionism as it emerged later in modern trade 
theory.',' Few politicians, capitalists, and economic writers occupied 
such neat and exclusive camps. Rather concern for liberty went hand in 
hand with a dose of agreed regulation of trade while protection, as a tra- 
ditional for111 of benevolence was underpinned by an organic represen- 
tation of interdependent interests. 
Both the generation of knowledge and its employment in the policy- 
making process, then, occurred in a larger, pre-existing cultural universe 
of ideas, values and language. It is unwise to presume that the profes- 
sionalization of economics at the turn of the twentieth century imme- 
diately or automatically put an end to this cultural situatedness of 
economic knowledge. The dissemination and contestation of practical 
economic knowledge about the progress of wages and prices, exports 
and imports, for example, were a staple of popular politics as well as 
state discussion before and after the First World War.14 As Tooze con- 
vincingly argues for inter-war Germany, it is problematic to view the fol- 
lowing decades as creating a divide between politics and  economic^.^^ A 
narrow focus on economics as professional knowledge in university 
departments unduly distracts from the many new and broader channels 
and outlets for economic knowledge in political debate, including par- 
ties' new research offices, expanding economic reporting in newspapers, 
and economic institutes. Whatever the growing divorce between eco- 
nomic and political thought in university departments, and the declin- 
ing number of chairs which carried that explicit job description, the two 
continued to flow in and out of each other in public political life. 
Indeed, it could be argued that, far from ushering in a decline of delib- 
erative politics, the new journalism was part of a media expansion that 
broadened the worlds of political economy. Clearly, this was a hybrid 
world, with different genres of communication for different audiences - 
the Economist, the Statist, and later the Financial Times and Wall Street 
Journal. Bagehot, not a formally trained economist, and editor of the 
Economist in the mid-Victorian period, saw his mission as spreading the 
principles of political economy. Likewise, George Paish, a practical, self- 
trained expert on trade and financial statistics was an advisor to the 
Treasury and Board of Trade in the early twentieth century.l"his 
hybridity, however, may be more usefully viewed as a continuation of 
nineteenth-century trends in the popular expansion of political econ- 
omy in advice literature, religious sermons, and theatrical productions, 
than as a sharp break. Early nineteenth-century journals and reviews 
provided an umbrella and shared context for erudite discussions of 
political economy, next to articles on science and literature.'' To under- 
stand the ebb and flow of the worlds of political economy, and their 
changing salience and reception, it is wise to broaden the view beyond 
the corridors of state power and beyond the intellectual canon of 
economics to civil society, law and communication. 
The third and final general contribution of this volume is to explore the 
transnational flows and barriers to the generation and contestation of 
political economy. 'Worlds', in a literal sense, here draws attention to the 
transnational dynamics of transmission. Once again, intellectual history 
and state-centred approaches have tended to favour a nation-state per- 
spective, be it to contrast different national schools of economic thought 
(British liberal vs German national economics; analytical vs historical, 
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and so forth) or to compare states' use and development of economic 
ideas and expertise. Yet, many of these states were not nation-states but 
imperial formations and, as such, involved - indeed, required - the expor- 
tation of knowledge and authority. As we shall see, this often involved 
a constructive dialogue with different practices of economic knowledge 
on the ground. In other words, by their nature of being imperial, many 
modern societies were themselves hybrid composites of different 
cultures of knowledge and practice. Furthermore, nation-states were not 
sealed containers but competitive contributors to a transnational 
exchange network of ideas and practices of development. Political 
economy provided a common currency in this transnational flow. 
In one seminal approach introduced by Alexander Gerschenkron, this 
mode of exchange is seen as late developing states observing front- 
runners in the development game, and adopting strategies of imitation 
or 1eapfrogging.l"his volume, by contrast, proceeds with a different 
geographic and temporal design that is less linear and more circular and 
porous. In the worlds of political economy, core and periphery were 
often part of a mutually interactive and creative relationship, rather 
than those of actor and passive recipient. As with the transatlantic 
exchange of social reform ideas at the turn of the twentieth century,19 
the transnational flow of economic knowledge proceeded in multiple, 
reciprocal directions. As Sheldon Garon's chapter on the transnational 
dynamic of savings campaigns shows, late modernizers like Japan not 
only contributed to and developed but also took political knowledge 
from Inore advanced industrial soc i e t i e~ .~~  Similarly, as den Otter shows, 
administrators and jurists in imperial India, did not simply impose the 
political cconoIny they had taken with them from the metropole, but 
adapted and revised their knowledge in practical encounters with dif- 
ferent cultures of the colonial economy.'l More generally, the uses and 
status of political economy were never pure and it cannot be understood 
on its own terms, for it often stood in productive tension with other 
rival forms and institutions of knowledge. Within national societies as 
well as within international organizations, this dynamic relationship 
between economic knowledge and other forms of knowledge created 
relationships that were sometimes symbiotic and sometimes conflicting 
between political economy, law, ecology and public health. 
So far we have pursued two shifts: first, from a seemingly autonomous 
world of ideas to the nlutual interaction between knowledge and prac- 
tice; second, from a state-centred perspective to areas of civil society, 
F,:,mpire and transnational relations. Together these turn attention to the 
points of contestation that shaped political economy. Contests over 
political economy - its substantive meanings, its socio-political scope, 
its institutional home, and its authoritative spokespersons and users - 
impinged on vital conduits of power and identity. Max Weber recog- 
nized that liberal economists did not stand in an objective relationship 
with the material world around them observing it in a neutral fashion, 
but were entangled in the shaping and reproduction of this world 
through the application of their knowledge.22 This point can be gener- 
alized beyond the question of the value neutrality of academic inquiry, 
to the many other ways in which popular economic knowledge has 
helped to shape the 'real' make-up of political economy. Hence, we 
are always speaking of political economy in two ways that need to be 
related through the interaction of idea and practice: political economy 
as a system of ideas, value, meanings; and knowledge in relation to the 
construction as well as observation of political economy in terms of the 
material relationship between state, market and civil society. The every- 
day life of imperial power in this double sense hinged on politicaI 
economy, just as much as did the modernization of Japan, the popular 
perception (and anxieties) of economic crises and political possibilities 
in Weimar Germany, or the social improvement of groups in civil 
society. At the same time, the scope and cultural purchase of political 
economy were not constant, but varied in different contexts and time 
periods. The history of economics and the state's relation to economic 
knowledge are part of this equation; they cannot explain it. To under- 
stand the changing historical significance of political economy, this 
volume argues, it is necessary to trace its generation, diffusion and 
contestation. To do so, the frame for analysing political economy needs 
to include both the political uses and meanings of economic knowledge 
and the influence of economic knowledge on political and institutional 
practices. The chapters to follow are case studies exploring the three 
approaches laid out above. 
Reviving political economy 
This volume is a historically informed contribution to the revival of 
interest in political economy developed since the late 1960s by Marxist, 
post-Keynesian and heterodox economists. By the mid-twentieth 
century 'political economy', as understood in the nineteenth century, 
had virtually become extinct. Although some chairs of political econ- 
omy have nominally survived, as at Cambridge, and some might still 
move back and forth when talking about the subject between econom- 
ics and some appreciation of political constraints on policy choice and 
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behavi~ur ,~Vn effect the mid-twentieth century were dark days for the 
broader subject, for a discourse with a proud pedigree of intellectual 
forefathers, and for its popular mission in the eighteenth and nine- 
teenth centuries. What had happened? We need to distinguish here 
between several distinct long-term trends in the intellectual trajectories 
of economic knowledge, the professionalization of knowledge, its insti- 
tutionalization, and the shifting dynamics and contours of popular 
everyday life and knowledge. And these, in turn, need to be connected 
to the changing semantic fields of economics and political economy. It 
is from here that a new more historically informed retrieval of political 
economy suggested in this volume will become apparent. 
One prominent approach is to distinguish between the following con- 
ceptions of political economy as revived from the 1960s: Marxist radi- 
cal economics; institutionalist economics; historical economics; system 
theorists; neoclassical public choice.24 Whereas the former four 
approaches offer distinctive ways of embedding economic processes in 
social, political or institutional spheres, the last approach reflects the 
increasingly ambitious project of recent neoclassical economics to sub- 
ject all social phenomena to market-based models of interpretation. 
Whatever the merits of public choice theory informing the latter proj- 
ect, the so-called 'economic imperialism' of the neoclassical model has 
certainly structured the way in which the current battle is conducted 
over what counts as 'political economy' and who owns it. And, 
inevitably, this has coloured and distorted current advocates' concep- 
tions of the historical fortunes and misfortunes of their subject. One 
prominent narrative that has emerged is to imagine a sharp break 
between the lineage of political economy (Smith, Ricardo, Mill) and a 
subsequent differentiation of an increasingly refined, separate analyti- 
cal   no del of economics (Jevons, Marshall, Walras and Menger all the 
way to Keynes and monetarists). This narrative, in short, deduces the 
decline of political economy from the well-known paradigm shift 
towards marginalism in the 1880s, often seen as the root evil of 
'economic imperialism' with its model of rational economic man. Thus, 
for example, recent advocates for an interdisciplinary revival of politi- 
cal economy have argued that the two sisters, politics and economics, 
were 'formally split in the late nineteenth century'.25 True, this is the 
period when Alfred Marshal1 sought to professionalize 'economics', 
with its distinct text book (his Principles ofEconomics), and its own under- 
graduate courses (the tripos of economics at Cambridge in 1903). Yet, 
this hardly amounted to a differentiation of economic knowledge in 
general, turning its back to politics, nor the enthronment of the rational 
utility-maximizing individual at the expense of all other moral, 
psychological and biological considerations. Moreover, it is a teleological 
account of economic theory with a strong Anglo-American bias that 
ignores the resilience of historical, institutional and radical economics 
in many parts of the world after the turn of the twentieth century. 
Much of the popular imagery of economics today as a 'dismal science' 
comes from its critics in the past, a view that was a staple as in Ruskin's 
critique of J. S. Mill. Today's writers seeking to disseminate their own 
version of political economy would do well to distinguish between such 
polemical accounts and the political and cultural cross-fertilization 
of economic knowledge that persisted. Neither during the heyday of 
classical nor of neoclassical economics is it possible to draw a stark 
dichotomy between schools of 'market' and 'culture' supposedly inhab- 
ited by economists and their critics. A critique of markets continued to 
be generated from within political economy. Mill, for instance, devel- 
oped a strong view of the environmental limits of market societies. 
Rather than seeing economics and their moral-political critics as two 
mutually exclusive clubs, it may be more appropriate to  view them as 
standing in a constructive dialogue. Economic knowledge was not only 
internally generated within its own frame of analysis but responded 
constructively to critiques produced by other knowledge forms, such as 
in Marshall's ethical liberal economics which responded to Ruskin's 
romantic cr i t iq~e. '~  
It is important not to read back the purer economistic versions that 
have come to dominate economic analysis onto the mindset of their 
intellectual forefathers. Marshall's consumer, for example, was not a 
simple machine with given preferences responding to laws of supply 
and demand, but an active individual whose wants were changing and 
driven by his activities: a socio-psychological need for distinction was 
irnperati~e.~' Instead of projecting key analytical categories into the 
past, the new history of political economy advocated here asks about 
the historical processes that created and shaped economic units of 
analysis, like the 'consumer', which, far from being universal or self- 
evident, only became a distinct category for social groups, institutions, 
and writers in the course of the nineteenth century, and then with greater 
prominence in some societies than in others.28 Well into the twentieth 
century, economists - including neoclassical economists - worked with 
organic, multi-layered social models of human actors, their nature and 
motivations. As Heath Pearson notes in this volume, the writings of 
Alfred Marshall, the founding father of economics, were thick with con- 
siderations of other-regarding actions, sympathy and bene~o lence .~~  
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Iiather than seeing a bifurcation between selfish individual man 
favoured by a model of neoclassical economics gaining power in some 
nations (Britain and later the United States) and visions of ecorrorrlie 
socilll or historical economics preserving their foothold in France, 
Germany and elsewhere, Pearson's inquiry reveals a shared international 
culture of altruism informing different economic theorists at the turn of 
the twentieth century.3o 
While we therefore welcome the recent revival of interest in political 
economy, we also argue that the current institutional and radical ver- 
sions that are set up in opposition to neoclassical economics are insuf- 
ficiently historicized, holding out ideal-typical distinctions between 
these schools that draw attention away from the workings of hybrid 
forms of economic knowledge in the past and from the cultural and 
social embeddedness of dominant or orthodox forms of economic 
ideas. Put differently, recent proponents of political economy have 
constructed a convenient history of their disempowerment by neoclas- 
sical econornics in the mid-twentieth century that closes the door to 
historical inquiry almost as quickly as it has opened it by all too happily 
accepting a much longer narrative of differentiation between 
politics and economics since the 1880s. This volume argues that this 
is an unfortunate and altogether debatable view of the role economic 
knowledge continued to play in society, culture and politics. Fixation 
on canonical authors can easily distract from broader worlds of political 
economy. Rather than starting from the assumption that the marginalist 
paradigm shift of the 1880s must have led to a differentiation of politics 
and economics, this volume proceeds from a more open, historical 
line of inquiry asking how political economy functioned in key social 
and international settings; how it continued to be generated, by 
what groups, with what meanings and for what aims, objects, and 
audiences, and in co-operation or conflict with what neighbouring 
fields of knowledge. 
A historically sensitive new political economy, then, needs to situate 
the changing status of the discipline of political economy in a broader 
interpretation of the relationship between economic knowledge and 
practice over time. Central questions in this relationship concern when 
and how different forms of knowledge stood in tension or in symbiosis; 
the changing political uses and institutional location of economic 
linowledge; the patterns of diffusion of economic ideas, data and values, 
their modes of transmission or blockage; and the place of political 
economy in nation-state and transnational developments. 
Tensions and symbiosis' 
Economic knowledge does not exist as the only form of knowledge, but 
operates in relation to other types of knowledge. In addition to tracing 
the internal development of intellectual traditions - the task of the his- 
tory of economic thought - it is also crucial to explore the sometimes 
competing and conflicting, sometimes symbiotic relationships which 
economic knowledge develops with other knowledge forms. Knowledge, 
information and ideas are generated and used in a competitive arena, 
and seek the attention of social groups, public bodies and international 
organizations. Like any other knowledge, economic knowledge can 
rarely claim an undisputed monopoly, and where it has managed to 
obtain influence, it requires social work to preserve its influence by 
either keeping rival knowledge claims and experts at bay or by solidify- 
ing the symbiotic relationship to adjacent forms of knowledge. 
The officials of the imperial state or the bureaucrats of international 
organizations were besieged by siren voices offering different passages 
through the rocks of economic policy. To whom were they to listen? In 
part, they were guided by their own sense of political expediency and 
self-preservation. But the economists who were seeking to make their 
voices heard might either form an alliance with other forms of knowl- 
edge and intellectual authority, or seek to challenge the claims of these 
rivals to speak on economic matters. Economic knowledge therefore 
stood in tension or symbiosis with adjacent disciplines depending on 
the precise historical circumstances. In colonial India, forests were con- 
tested by the native populations and the Raj. Notions of property rights 
were deeply contested throughout the colonial world and a prime site 
where law and economics collided or worked together depending on dif- 
ferent contexts and  tradition^.^^ Economists were also in tension, as 
Reisz indicates, with ecologists and foresters.32 The property rights of 
native peoples might be threatened because of their perceived 'uneco- 
nomic' use of their resources - but ecologists also began to argue that 
capitalist owners destroyed ecological resources and long-term benefits. 
Forest legislation, like property regimes more generally, provided an 
arena for competing forms of knowledge that sought the attention of 
officials and politicians. Law intruded into these debates, sometimes as 
an ally of political economists seeking to weaken the restraints on a free 
market in land and its product, and sometimes as a restraint on what 
was seen as an unequal and inequitable attack on valid claims by the 
occupiers of land. 
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The story of tension and symbiosis between law and economics is also 
found in Steinmetz's account of legal disputes on restraint of trade in 
Germany and Britain from 1870 to the First World War.33 Should indi- 
viduals have freedom to make a contract - or should they be given free- 
dom to enter into trade, which would mean that contracts in restraint 
of trade should be struck down? The question was one which puzzled 
lawyers and economists in both countries - but were they arguing in 
autonomous intellectual spheres, did they take account of each other's 
approaches to reach mutual understanding, or were they in tension? 
Much the same issue arises in the case of medical knowledge. As Amrith 
shows in his chapter, debates over public health in the United Nations 
raised the old spectre of Malthusian crisis which had alarmed British 
governments in the early nineteenth century and the Raj in the later 
nineteenth century.34 Would the interventions of public health pro- 
grammes run by the World Health Organisation provide the path to 
prosperity by ending the waste of resources by disease, so raising pro- 
ductivity and allowing economic growth based on social justice? Or 
were doctors simply threatening a further slide into poverty as popula- 
tion growth outstripped resources? Why save people from malaria only 
for them to starve? Perhaps a better answer was to mobilize doctors in a 
different way, to control births. Economic and medical programmes 
competed for legitimacy and for funding, responding to each other's 
arguments and shifting their ground as appropriate. Even when the 
battle was won or lost, and a particular programme was rejected or 
accepted, economic ideas then encountered everyday practices, where 
working knowledge of family or communal behaviour was needed. 
Colonial officials or the local medical officers might soon find that 
responses to various economic incentives were not as expected or 
intended - and the question arose of whether to change behaviour or to 
amend policies. For men on the ground, facing immediate dilemmas of 
authority and consent, the answer was often the latter. 
The institutional location of economic knowledge 
Much of the literature on modern economic thought is about econo- 
mists written by economists or economic historians, that is by univer- 
sity people and (mainly) for university people. For a new history of 
political ecorlorrly as outlined above it is wise to take a broader institu- 
tional view of the subject. For economists in universities are only a 
small, and at many times insignificant group in the generation, dissem- 
ination, and contestation of economic knowledge. Even in Britain at the 
turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, which is often seen as 
the core of the intellectual and institutional expansion of the new 
marginalist economics, the new method was actually marginal in a cul- 
tural sense - it was far from dominant. In 1894, the British Association 
for the Advancement of Science issued a blazing indictment of eco- 
nomic training, concluding that it 'was difficult to imagine a more 
complete indifference to the scientific study of Economics than that dis- 
played at the present time.'35 Indeed, Marshall, the very doyen of the 
discipline, had immense difficulties attracting students to his new 
course. Contemporaries found things were much better in America and 
continental Europe where economically trained experts occupied crucial 
positions in the civil service and where economic analysis was a central 
component of social and political investigation broadly defined. 
Yet, it is dangerous to overdo the contrast between national systems. 
As Adam Tooze's chapter shows,36 next to the German civil service - 
long dominated by the patronage, vision and students of the leading 
historical economist Gustav Schmoller - and the German university 
(also located within the state system), there was a host of alternative, 
commercial and party-political networks of knowledge generation and 
communication, from expanding forms of economic journalism to new 
statistical services, and party and trades-union in-house research groups. 
Looking beyond established and recognized institutional bodies, then, 
suggests some more general transnational trends that complicate a sim- 
ple division between statist and civil society-oriented knowledge sys- 
tems. Political economy had an important presence in the imperial 
state. Civil servants in British India had ingested a heavy dose of polit- 
ical economic training at Haileybury, and Malthus had a continued 
influence on reactions to famine in the Raj.37 In Britain, too, newspa- 
pers like The Economist or The Manchester Guardian had played seminal 
functions in creating new economic experts as well as in communicat- 
ing facts, ideas and representations of the economy. J.A. Hobson, 
the heretical progressive economist, wrote for the latter in the late 
nineteenth-century; W. Layton, the editor of the former in the 1920s, 
used his authority as an expert in domestic and international debates. 
Liberal party organizations followed Conservative tariff reform bodies in 
the Edwardian period in setting up in-house researchers and authors on 
particular trades. The Trades Union Congress started its own (admittedly 
small) economic research department in the early 1920s. The late 
nineteenth-century transatlantic network of buyers' leagues and con- 
sumer leagues generated a mass of information on working conditions, 
prices and shop hours, a process that considerably expanded with the 
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development of the larger and more technocratic American consumer 
bodies in the inter-war years, like Consumers' Research and Consumers 
Union, which became the models for many later consumer organiza- 
tions elsewhere. More than any other social reform movement and insti- 
tutional network, Home Economics, with its expanding curriculum and 
growing foothold in secondary and college education, expanded the 
economic knowledge horizons (and political demands) of men and 
women in the first half of the twentieth century.38 From a marketing 
direction, the proliferation of commercial and academic market research 
organizations mainly took shape outside established universities, 
although this did not prevent marketing research from leaving its 
imprint on public policy and the theoretical development of economics 
in mid-nineteenth century.j9 
Institutions, then, play an important role for understanding the sub- 
stance, flow and limits of economic knowledge. To this extent, the new 
institutional economics has a point. But it is the actors, and the values 
and  meanings they mobilize or contest through institutions, not rigor- 
ous pre-determined structures, that are of primary concern. Institutional 
structures shape the room for manoeuvre, the capacities for fighting the 
battle again or in a different way, but do not ordain the outcome. The 
Toyes' analysis of the United Nations is a case in point, where hetero- 
dox ideas emerged, despite the desire of bureaucrats to close off 
debates."" Economists knew how to work within its diffuse structure, in 
a way they were less able to do in the World Bank with its stricter con- 
trol by leading industrial countries. There had been a similar contrast 
between the British and American state in response to the new eco- 
nomic ideas of the 1930s: the tighter hold of the Treasury and its firmly 
entrenched mandarins meant that newer ideas had a harder task than 
in the United States, with a less entrenched civil service and a more dif- 
fuse power structure.'" Of course, academic economics has its own insti- 
tutional structures which made it more or less easy to secure an 
authoritative status for opinions. Access to the pages of prestigious jour- 
nals was controlled by editors who might be averse to new ideas; 
appointment committees might define certain approaches as inappro- 
priate and unacceptable. Professionalization was not a simple, beneficial 
process as it appears in some accounts: it was also about the gradual 
exclusion of heterodoxy, whether of radical or often female voices. 
But this is to flirt with pre-determined outcomes according to struc- 
tures. For government institutions, like the Treasury, could be attacked 
from without through mobilizing public opinion, through the insidious 
work of intellectual criticism in academic journals and its popularization 
in the press. New economic ideas emerged from what might now be 
called think-tanks, from the Fabian Society to the Institute of Economic 
Affairs, which challenged the dominance of the current orthodoxy within 
the academy. Are politicians influenced by the ideas of economics - or 
is it rather that politicians turn to economists for the intellectual author- 
ity to justify actions and policies taken for other reasons, as has been the 
case with recent neo-liberal policies in America, Europe and Asia? 
Economic ideas will only be adopted when transmitted through a wider 
cultural process of diffusion and connected to a language through 
which the economy and economic behaviour is understood. The inter- 
national hegemony of state power means that this process of diffusion 
is not a free or neutral powerless process equally open to all participants, 
but likewise, international hegemons, like the United States or the 
British empire before it, do not exert or export policies and knowledges 
outside this cultural process, which is always open to contestation and 
revision. 
Diffusion of knowledge: transmission, blockages 
and systems of cultural provisioning 
One critique of neoclassical theory and modelling made by recent 
advocates of political economy - a critique that can be traced back to late 
nineteenth-century historical economists and institutionalists as well as 
to more popular movements, like home economics - has been that a nar- 
row focus on questions of utility-maximization fails to grasp the more 
organic societal configuration of economic life. Instead of reducing 
economic questions to ones of the efficient allocation of resources, one 
call has been to think in terms of 'social pro~isioning' .~~ Another critical 
voice has focused on the way in which mainstream economics itself 'is 
pitifully inadequate with respect to the more traditional factors commonly 
treated within its own discipline in comprehending the economics of 
consumption itself (the nature and sources of technology etc.)'.43 Instead 
it calls for a 'system of provision' approach in which consumer choice is 
itself the changing product of the social and economic processes that are 
connected to particular commodities, their production, distribution and 
consumption. More generally, historians and sociologists have re-embedded 
markets as historically changing ideas and practices of social CO-~rdination.~~ 
Taking these discussions further to inquire into the diffusion of economic 
knowledge, we can inquire into cultural modes of provision, that is the 
values, ideas and genres of communication that disseminate and shape 
political economy in different social settings at different times. 
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Of course, economists have recognized asymmetry of information, 
imperfect knowledge and bounded rationality. But these qualifications 
ultimately all point back to an essential economic individualism. Here 
we want to step back from the attempt of economists to understand 
what forms of information and reasoning goes into individual decisions 
of choice or utility-maximization, in order to raise a more cultural ques- 
tion about how information circulates in the first place: what are its lim- 
its and exclusions, how does it reach some parts of society but not 
others, percolating into some political debates but being sidelined in 
others? In addition to asking about how markets come into being, then, 
the question becomes a more open historical one that asks what sort of 
knowledge about economic processes actually circulates. The existence 
of market society does not automatically tell us about the system of cul- 
tural provision of knowledge and communication through which mem- 
bers of that society obtain their views of the economy. 
If economic knowledge can be said to be competing with other forms 
of knowledge, the marketplace for ideas also involves different genres 
and processes of dissemination. These concern discursive tropes through 
which ideas or data acquire social purchase as well as social and media 
bodies through which such ideas and discourses are disseminated, and 
the popular acts of reception through which actors, listeners and 
viewers make sense of these ideas and 'facts'. 
The ways in which genres of communication and knowledge in terms 
of ideas and substantive meaning interact have been an important 
theme especially for sociological and historical inquiries into the 
transformation of knowledge in early modern science and print 
culture." The understanding of modern economic knowledge has 
benefited far less from this literature. Statistics, it has been shown, trans- 
formed the visual representation of economic data and economic 
processes, as well as the generation of facts that were assigned new 
authoritative status.46 Clearly, the supply and demand curve that have 
become a ubiquitous sign of economic literacy in classrooms, corporate 
boardrooms, and media-screens all over the world structured economic 
understanding and not just recorded data. Yet the algebraic-graphic 
turn of economics also created new problems for experts and politicians 
seeking to utilize this newly packaged and steadily expanding informa- 
tion in persuading voters or mobilizing party supporters or social move- 
m e n t ~ . ~ ~  Instead of charting the story of twentieth-century economics 
in terms of a perpetually refined analytical model, from the perspective 
of communication we may rather see it as the growing asymmetry 
between ever more sophisticated tools and ever richer data, on the one 
hand, and a growing need to communicate economic knowledge in 
accessible manner in an age of mass democracy and mass propaganda, 
indeed to modulate economic behaviour in accordance with the imper- 
atives of economic policy. 
One answer to this challenge can be found in the recycling and adap- 
tation of older images and genres of economic knowledge to communi- 
cate appropriate ways of viewing and responding to more complex 
modern economic challenges. In Britain, Labour supporters after the 
Second World War explained the predicament of the national economy 
and their economic policy towards balance of trade and payments in 
terms of 'good housekeeping': the government was likened to 'the good 
housewife [who] shares out the food fairly', looks after her family, 
house, and garden, and balances her incoming money and outgoing 
expenses.48 In nationalist but also liberal economics, mass mobilizations 
of supporters continued to translate complex economic processes into 
an organic image of the family. Representations of the economy were 
therefore gendered and also involved generational images of independ- 
enceldependence. In the massive campaigns and exhibitions to pro- 
mote the purchase of national products in early twentieth-century 
China, for example, economic decision-making was portrayed in terms 
of the national family. Women's consumption choices were represented 
simultaneously as alternative forms of military defence and tied to 
child-bearing ac t iv i t ie~ .~~ Similarly in the West, versions of economic 
imperialism, like the tariff reform movement in Edwardian Britain, 
portrayed the state of the economy through a gendered representation 
of male breadwinners losing their independence, civic virtue and social 
standing as pater familias thanks to the inflow of cheap goods and 
immigrant labour in a Free Trade system.50 Such gendered models were 
not only discursive phenomena but had significant legacies on welfare 
state structures and social relations; in Britain, in contrast to France, 
social provision in the twentieth century centred on the male bread- 
winner.51 It is dangerous, however, to contrast such organic or gendered 
renderings of the economy in conservative or nationalist traditions with 
supposedly purer, more modern or rational knowledge in liberal politi- 
cal economy. For contemporary Free Trade, popular politics was equally 
keen to reduce complex economic questions into easily manageable, 
culturally loaded stereotypes (the white loaf vs the black loaf), and to 
invoke the healthy family unit as a symbol of the superior workings of 
its own policy. 
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Conclusion 
Together the  chapters in this volume are explorations in  a new history 
of political economy. Instead of a linear, synthetic narrative, they open 
up shared themes and problems that  have all too often been submerged 
or eliminated altogether in accounts driven by the  expansion of the  
modern state, interest group formation, or the evolution of economic 
theory from classical, t o  neoclassical to  Keynesian and monetarist mod- 
els. Instead of a footnote, or a subject best left to  'soft' disciplines, the  
chapters assembled here take the  broader cultural formation and signif- 
icance of political economy as their starting point. As with science or 
any other body of ideas, economic ideas and knowledges, too, need to  
be reconnected to  their broad fields of practice, including everyday prac- 
tices, working knowledge, and the  generation of cultural values in  civil 
society - as well as at the  level of state departments or in economics' text- 
books. By doing so, the volume helps to  problematize a story of profes- 
sionalization that has been viewed primarily from within the  
professionalized communities and agencies of economists themselves. For 
most of the modern period, however, economic knowledge had far deeper 
and diffuse roots in many arenas of public life; economic writers were 
working within this larger culture of political economy, not  apart from or 
above it. The diffuse and complex popular resonance of political economy 
means that, prior to  the  development of more abstract free-standing the- 
oretical models, economic knowledge stood in a constructive field of 
engagement with other forms of knowledge - constructive both in  the  
sense of being able to  mobilize symbiotic relationships as well as in  the  
sense of having to  respond to  rival claims of authority and legitimacy 
from other forms of knowledge. As this volume shows, these exchanges 
and encounters operated not only within nation-states but also across and 
between them, producing a transnational transfer of ideas and practices. 
Our understanding of the current dynamics and limits of globalization 
will be much assisted by a greater emphasis on this broad set of social and 
cultural knowledges and practices and their transnational workings that 
have shaped the worlds of political economy in the  past. 
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